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The purpose of this thesis is to compare the cost effectiveness of alternative 
methods of providing logistics support for commercially available products 
purchased by the Government. These products will be referred to under the generic 
title of nondevelopmental items. The thesis focuses on the acquisition and support 
strategies for the Pmtable Hydraulic Access Rescue System (PHARS) as a means of 
addressing this issue. The effectiveness of alternative methods used to provide 
logistic support for the PHARS is examined via a cost-benefit analysis. The analysis 
indicates that nondevelopmental items with system wide applications, low failure 
rates, high urgency of need, mid-range cost, and well established geographically 
diverse contractors may best be supported via a mix of contractor and organic 
support. This analysis may be of value to future program managers in assisting their 
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The Department of Defense (DOD) in 1996 finds itself in 
a uniquely challenging situation. Round after round of budget 
cuts have not been matched by reduced operational 
requirements. This is resulting in DOD finding itself under 
unparalleled pressure to be both effective and efficient. This 
pressure is quantified in a vast array of statutory and 
regulatory guidance. As one means of addressing the issue, DOD 
has embraced the concept of fulfilling procurement 
requirements via nondevelopmental items. 
At first glance nondevelopmental items appear to offer 
the ideal solution to the challenge. They are able to offer 
state of the art technological capabilities combined with an 
initial lower life cycle cost. Additionally, they can be 
introduced more quickly than traditional developmental 
systems. Nondevelopmental items foster competition by 
widening the range of defense contractors that are able to do 
business with the DOD~ They also encourage entrepreneurs to 
bear research and development costs that would otherwise fall 
upon the government. 
Many programs are rushing to reap the benefits of a 
nondevelopmental item acquisition. The problem with this 
scenario is that in their rush they may be failing to consider 
the most cost effective method of providing logistics support 
for that item. Given the increasing emphasis on this type of 
procurement, the importance of examining methods to accomplish 
it in a successful and long term cost effective fashion cannot 
be overstated. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to compare the cost 
effectiveness of alternative methods of providing logistic 
support for a nondevelopmental item. It will entail examining 
in detail the procurement of the Portable Hydraulic Access 
Rescue System (PHARS), also known as the "Jaws of Life." The 
intent will be not only to determine the optimal support 
strategy for the PHARS but also to extrapolate the data from 
the PHARS to provide decision makers with a framework for 
analyzing logistic support strategies for other 
nondevelopmental items of a similar nature. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
• Are there more cost effective methods of 
providing logistics support for the PHARS? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages in a 
nondevelopmental item acquisition? 
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• What are the primary logistic support strategies 
used by DOD for nodevelopmental items? 
• What form of logistic support was intended at the 
outset of the PHARS procurement and what was the 
impact of that choice? 
• What form of logistic support is currently 
provided for the PHARS? 
• Are there ways to improve the cost effectiveness 
of logistic support for NDis similar to the 
PHARS? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis will focus on logistic support strategies and 
alternatives for the PHARS. In order to establish a framework 
for this it will be necessary to examine the primary logistic 
support strategies used by DOD to support nondevelopmental 
items. Comparisons will then be made as to the cost 
effectiveness, potential benefits, alternatives and long range 
ramifications of each method. The potential for extending the 
data from the PHARS to other similar nondevelopmental items 
will be explored. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Data on nondevelopmental items, their history and methods 
of support will be obtained via an archival based method 
focusing on legislation, government reports and military 
instructions. Data on the PHARS will be obtained through 
manufacturers and Government documents, as well as personal 
interviews with the manufacturers technical representatives. 
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Data on the PHARS procurement will be obtained through 
contractual documents and interviews with key decision makers 
at Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) , Navy Inventory Control 
Point (NAVICP) and the Secretary of the Navy's Safety and 
Survivability Office. A survey will be used to determine 
fleet response to the support provided the PHARS at the Supply 
Officer and Damage Control Assistant (DCA) level. 
The data will then be analyzed to determine the cost and 
level of operator satisfaction with the current support 
strategy for the PHARS. This cost and level of satisfaction 
will then be examined via cost benefit analysis with 
projections of costs and levels of satisfaction provided by 
alternative support measures for the PHARS. Recommendations 
will be made regarding the programs effectiveness, the 
supportability and utility of the item and the optimal support 
strategy. 
F. ABBREVIATIONS 
A list of abbreviations and acronyms may be found in 
Appendix A. 
G. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter I has 
served as the introduction. Chapter II will provide an 
overview of nondevelopmental items, a definition for them, 
their history, pertinent policy, methods of support and 
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inherent advantages and disadvantages. Chapter III will cover 
the PHARS, its acquisition history, support philosophy, 
current method of support and performance to date. Chapter IV 
will provide an examination of current logistic support issues 
facing the PHARS program today. Chapter V will be a cost 
benefit analysis of the data presented in Chapter III and IV 
with respect to the options presented in Chapter II. Chapter 
VI will be composed of a summary of the information presented 




II. NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide the background information and 
theoretical framework necessary to the discussion of methods 
of logistic support for a nondevelopmental item. The chapter 
will begin by defining what a nondevelopmental item is and 
examining the history of the nondevelopmental item movement in 
DOD. This will be followed by an overview of the DOD 
acquisition process with respect to both developmental and 
nondevelopmental items. Next will be a review of the primary 
advantages and disadvantages associated with a 
nondevelopmental item procurement. Finally the chapter will 
examine the primary methods of providing logistic support for 
a nondevelopmental item and the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach. 
B. DEFINITION OF A NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEM 
There are a range of definitions available to describe 
just what exactly a nondevelopmental item is. It seems that 
each level of government, from Congress on down, has published 
its own definition of a nondevelopmental item. A broad 
definition of is provided by the Defense Systems Management 
College which defines nondevelopmental item as: "a term 
covering material available from a range of sources with 
little or no developmental effort required by the 
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Government." [Ref. 1: p. 3] 
A more thorough description is provided by Department of 
Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.2, which defines 
nondevelopmental items as: 
1. Any item available in the commercial marketplace. 
2. Any previously developed item in use by a Federal, State, 
or local Agency of the United States or a foreign government 
with which the United States has a mutual defense cooperation 
agreement. 
3. Any item described in subparagraph 1 or 2 that requires 
only minor modification to meet the requirements of the 
procuring agency. 
4. Any item currently being produced that does not meet the 
requirements of subparagraph 1, 2, or 3 solely because the 
i tern is- not yet in use or is not yet available in the 
commercial marketplace. [Ref. 2:p. 6-L-1] 
C. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The roots of the non-developmental item movement can be 
traced back at least as far as 1972- when the Commission on 
Government Procurement acknowledged the need for a 
philosophical shift in the government's acquisition policies. 
The focus of the shift was intended to be away from 
developmental items and towards the commercial marketplace. 
[Ref. 3:p. 1-1] --
This movement received an enormous boost in June of 1986 
when President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management, also known as the Packard Commission, issued its 
final Report. Amidst a host of sweeping suggestions for 
change the Commission came out strongly in favor of non-
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developmental items by specifically recommending that: 
Rather than relying on excessively rigid military 
specifications, DOD should make greater use of 
components, systems and services available off-the-
shelf. It should develop new or custom made items 
only when it has been established that those 
readily available are clearly inadequate to meet 
military requirements. [Ref. 4:p. 60] 
The United States Congress apparently took these 
recommendations to heart and gave them the force of law with 
the passage of the 1987 Defense Appropriations Act. Included 
in Section 907 of Public Law 99-591 is a statutory preference 
for the DOD to use nondevelopmental items. The law 
specifically states that: 
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure to the maximum 
extent practicable--
( 1) Requirements of the DOD with response 
procurement of supplies are stated in terms of--
(a) functions to be performed 
(b) performance required 
(c) essential physical characteristics 
(2) Such requirements are defined so 





(3) such requirements are fulfilled through the use 
of non-developmental items. [Ref. 5] 
In 1991 DOD took additional steps to ensure compliance 
with the law. Both DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2 included 
specific instructions with respect to the acquisition of non-
developmental items. DOD 5000.1 states that: 
Maximum practicable use shall be made of commercial 
9 
and other non-developmental items. In describing 
these items maximum practicable use shall be made 
of non-government standards and commercial item 
description. [Ref. 6 :p. 1-4] 
DOD Directive 5000.2 provides further amplification in 
the statement that: 
It 
"Material requirements shall be satisfied to the 
maximum extent practicable through the use of 
nondevelopmental items when such products will meet 
the user's needs and are cost-effective over the 
entire life cycle." [ Ref. 2:p. 6-L-2] 
is noteworthy that DOD Directive 5000.2, while 
acknowledging the significance of cost effectiveness, fails to 
provide any criteria by which to determine it. 
The most recent policy on the use of non-developmental 
items is contained in the 1993 National Performance Review. 
The review, chaired by Vice President Gore, suggests that the 
government should rely more on the commercial marketplace to 
fulfill its procurement requirements. Specifically the report 
recommends that: 
The Pentagon make greater use of commercial 
products and abandon military specifications as 
much as possible. That Agency Heads reveiew and 
revise internal policies and procedures to allow 
for the purchase of commercial products wherever 
practical and to take advantage of market 
conditions.- · ThatGovernment procurement as a whore 
shift from rigid rules to guiding principals that 
will shift to a new emphasis on choosing best value 
products and foster competittiveness and commercial 
practices. [Ref. 7:p. 28-30] 
D. THE DOD ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The DOD acquisition process for developmental items is an 
incredibly complex, expensive and time consuming affair. It is 
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composed of five phases each with its own milestone review. It 
is described by the Defense Systems Management College as: 
The sequence of acquisition activities starting 
with the agency's reconciliation of it's mission 
needs, with it's capabilities, priorities and 
resources and extending through the introduction of 
a system into operational use or the otherwise 
successful achievement of program objectives. [Ref. 
16: p. 1.4-5] 
The first step in this process is the documentation of a 
war fighting deficiency. This is accomplished via a document 
known as the Mission Needs Statement (MNS) . The Mission Needs 
Statement defines the requirement in the broadest possible 
terms, e.g., prevent an armored formation from advancing 200 
kilometers beyond the front lines. [Ref 6: p. 2-3] . As the 
requirement progresses through the acquisition process these 
broad statements will be continuously· refined and detailed in 
a process known as tailoring. 
The next step in the process is Milestone 0. This occurs 
upon approval of the Mission Needs statement and signifies the 
beginning of the Concept Exploration and Definition Phase. At 
this point the -ServiGe Component will establish a program 
office in order to develop, produce and support the system. 
During this phase the program manager is responsible for 
evaluating alternative concepts with respect to their life 
cycle costs, deployment schedules and performance 
characteristics. This is the point in time where the 
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utilization of a nondevelopmental item in place of a 
developmental one should first be considered. 
At the conclusion of the Concept Exploration and 
Definition phase a determination is made as to whether or not 
the system merits a new acquisition program. If this is 
determined to be the case the system will then progress Into 
Phase I, Demonstration and Validation. 
During the Demonstration and Validation Phase the program 
manager is responsible for delineating essential design 
characteristics and capabilities. Additionally critical 
technologies are demonstrated and processes vital to the 
concept are proven. Upon completion of this phase the program 
enters into another review at Milestone II, known as 
Development Approval. A decision to continue with the program 
at this point leads to Phase II, Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development. 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development consists of the 
program manager developing the most promising design into a 
stable, producible and cost effective system. At the 
conclusion of this phase a.decision is made regarding whether 
the system merits full production. If it does, the system then 
moves into Phase III, Production and Deployment. 
During Production and Deployment the system is placed in 
full rate production and fielded to meet the mission 
requirement. Hopefully, as a result of the exhaustive review 
process, the system will satisfy the mission requirement and 
12 
• . I . 
move directly into the final phase, Phase IV Operations and 
Support. Should the system require any significant 
modifications a final milestone, Milestone IV, Major 
Modification Approval is conducted. This milestone has the 
potential to take the program all the way back to the 
beginning of Phase Two! 
This process is the framework for all developmental 
acquisition programs. It is presented, in an extremely 
abbreviated fashion for purposes of illustration only. A much 
more detailed treatment may be found in DOD Directive 5000.1 
Defense Acquisition, and DOD Instruction 5000.2 Defense 
Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures. It is 
noteworthy that on average it takes between 8 and 16 years for 
a full scale developmental system to make its way through the 
entire process. [Ref. 14:p. 25] 
E. NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS AND THE DOD ACQUISITION PROCESS. 
Certainly one of the most attractive features of a 
nondevelopmental item acquisition is the speed with which the 
system can be fielded. A nondevelopmental acquisition 
generally takes between two and one half and five years 
compared to eight to sixteen for a developmental system. [Ref 
14:p. 25] 
Nondevelopmental acquisitions are able to save time at 
virtually ever step of the process. The Demonstration and 
Validation Phase and the Engineering and Manufacturing Phase, 
13 
-.!. 
and their associated costs are borne by the commercial 
developer. These phases can be eliminated outright or 
drastically scaled back. This four to nine year cycle can be 
compressed into a one to two year "Proof of Principal" phase. 
[Ref. 14:p. 24] 
The speed with which a nondevelopmental system may be 
fielded is a double edged sword however. The time savings in 
the acquisition process is roughly the time the system uses to 
create a logistics support network and training plan for the 
system. It is important to recognize that while certain costs 
are avoided, equally tangible benefits are also being forgone. 
A comparative illustration of the two processes is 
provided in Figure 1. 
14 
Classical Research and Development 8-16 Yrs 













1 Yr None 1-2 Yrs 9 Mos-2Yrs 
t ____ t
Nondevelopmental Item Acquisition 2 1/2-5 Yrs 
Figure 1 [Ref. 14:p. 25] 
F.ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS 
1. Advantages Of Nondevelopmental Items 
This list by its nature must be subjective. It is not 
intended to be all inclusive but rather to offer a range of 
what the researcher considers to be the primary or most 
significant advantages and disadvantages inherent in the 
acquisition of nondevelopmental items. 
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a. Speed 
The compressed acquisition cycle for 
nondevelopmental items allows DOD to respond more quickly to 
emergent operational requirements. 
b. State-Of-The-Art-Material 
Nondevelopmental Items allow DOD to capitalize on 
state-of-the-art innovations in technology and application. In 
fields changing as rapidly and dramatically as electronics, 
computers, optics and communications this can be critical. 
c. Risk Reduction 
A nondevelopmental item acquisition allows the DOD 
to minimize risk in the technical and schedule arena of a 
program by placing the burden of research, test and 
development on the commercial market place. [ Ref. S:p.l-5] 
d. Lower Life ~cle Costs 
Nondevelopmental items generally tend to have 
initially lower life cycle costs due to increased market place 
competition, reduced research and development costs and the 
use of commercial specifications. Additionally, a firm off-
the-shelf price will allow a program manager to more 
accurately project funding requirements, reducing variability 
and enhancing program stability. 
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e. Maintenance Of The Industria~ Base 
Expanded demand from the government will serve to 
broaden and maintain the industrial base. [Ref. 9:p. 10] In an 
era beset with defense downsizing this is a significant 
ancillary benefit. 
f. Qua~ity 
The quality of nondevelopmental items has proven to 
be as good or better than items specifically developed to 
meet military requirements. [Ref. 10:p. 5] 
g. Simp~ified Contracting Procedures 
Nondevelopmental items are more likely to be 
procured under a Fixed Price type Contract. These contracts 
are less complicated to administer and place more of the risk 
burden on the contractor and less on the Government. [Ref. 
11:p. 11] 
h. Statutory And Regu~atory Comp~iance 
The simple fact is that both the law of the land and 
DOD Regulation have clearly established a preference for 
nondevelopmental item acquisitions. Their use will allow the 
purchasing agency to address some of the issues of waste and 
inefficiency associated with more traditional forms of 
procurement. 
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2. Disadvantages Of Nondevelopmental Items 
a. Logistics Support 
To date, nondevelopmental item acquisitions in DOD 
remain the exception rather than the rule. As such they do not 
fit easily into the rigid and highly structured process DOD 
Uses to provide logistics support for an item. It is possible 
for a nondevelopmental item to fail, become unrepairable or 
even obsolete prior to the first delivery of spare parts 
onboard a fleet unit. [Ref. 12:p. 20] 
Additionally the speed with which a nondevelopmental item 
may be procured generally precludes any formal type of 
logistic support analysis or consideration of support 
requirements. In effect this responsibility is shifted to the 
developer of the item. This results in increased reliance on 
the developer for support. 
b. Configuration Control and Obsolescence 
What some see as advantages in procurring state of 
the art material, others see as disadvantages in the areas of 
configuration control and obsolescence. The rapid introduction 
and discontinuance of high tech products may cause 
nondevelopmental product configuration to lag behind or become 
obsolete. In turn, this can serve to make configuration 
management more difficult. [Ref.l3: p.5] 
An easy way to illustrate this point is through the 
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example of the desktop computer. Ten years ago this item was 
not common at the shipboard level. Today, however, PC's are as 
common on ships as bad coffee. Unfortunately, as each ship 
rushed into the commercial marketplace to take advantage of 
the computer revolution they purchased various brands with 
different configurations. This process has been repeated as 
each successive generation of computers has been introduced or 
as the commands saw turnover in those with purchase authority. 
The end result has been mishmash of machines with different 
operating systems, different capabilities, different software 
and different support requirements. Each ship must carry a 
range of spare parts to support these unique systems. The 
lack of commonality makes organic logistic support difficult. 
c. Training 
The speed with which a nondevelopmental item can be 
introduced into the system may preclude the development and 
institution of a conventional training establishment. Clearly 
the utility of the item is reduced if no one in the 
organization is familiar with proper operating procedure. 
d. Increased Safe~ Concerns 
The move away from military standards (MILSTD) and 
military specifications (MILSPEC) and into the commercial 
marketplace has some potentially dire consequences. The rigid 
performance criteria and extensive testing and documentation 
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that go into a developed item are counted as a blessing by 
many who must field, fight or fly the system. The challenge 
will be to reap the benefits of non-developmental acquisitions 
without incurring human costs due to equipment that is less 
exhaustively tested. 
G. METHODS OF SUPPORTING NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS 
There are four primary approaches used to provide 
logistic support for a non-developmental item. They are: 
(1) No Support. The item is simply discarded upon 
failure. ( 
(2) Organic Support. The Government develops its own 
support program to include spares provisioning, a 
maintenance philosophy and a training plan. 
(3) Total Contractor Support. The polar opposite of 
organic support. The responsibility for spares and 
maintenance is delegated either contractually or by 
default to the manufacturer. 
(4) Organic and Contractor Support Mix. Combines features 
from methods two and three. [Ref. 14] 
1. No Support 
The no support method requires the lowest level of 
logistics support·. Sinse the item is intended to be discarded 
upon failure, no repair parts or complex maintenance 
philosophy are necessary. When the item fails it is replaced 
by the user with another identical item. Although this 
approach to support appears to be wasteful, there are 
important marginal cost issues to consider before deciding 
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whether to accept or reject it. In general the approach should 
be considered viable as long as the marginal benefit derived 
from its use exceeds the marginal costs of its implementation. 
There are a number of characteristics inherent in an item 
that lend themselves towards the no support option. These 
include: 
• Relative low cost. While an item may satisfy the 
MB = MC relationship criteria for throwaway at 
any cost level, in general this method is applied 
to less expensive items. 
• Simplified fault detection and isolation. This 
implies some form of highly reliable unit self 
test capability. This is necessary to prevent the 
operator from discarding an item incorrectly 
diagnosed as having failed. 
• Modular construction. Internal accessibility is 
usually limited since no maintenance is planned. 
[Ref. 14:p. 40] 
a. Advantages 
The obvious appeal of this method is the minimal 
requirement for any investment in logistics support. No lower 
level spares are required since the unit is intended to be 
discarded and replaced upon failure. Since maintenance actions 
will be -limited -to remove-- and replace functions 1 maint-enance 
training and skill requirements are kept to an absolute 
minimum. [Ref. lS:p. 32] 
Another significant appeal of this approach is the speed 
with which it allows a system to be placed in the hands of 
the operator. The acquisition system's only concern is 
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procuring sufficient quantities of the item. This feature is 
particularly attractive as the urgency of need for the item 
increases. 
b. Disadvantages 
Not providing support is potentially the most costly 
method of addressing logistics. Additionally, even if the 
approach makes fiscal sense, the perception of wastefulness on 
behalf of the government may be sufficient in today's budget 
conscious climate to render it infeasible. 
There are several other pitfalls with this approach. The 
concept does not always lend itself equally well to both 
peacetime and wartime environments. [Ref. 14:p. 42] 
Additionally, since no repair is planned, critical items would 
require the maintenance of some inventory stock levels. 
Accurately determining that level may require a more detailed 
level of logistical analysis than the concept provides for. 
2. Organic Support 
Organic support requires the Government to assume 
complete responsibility for all facets of logistic support. 
This would include the development of allowance parts lists 
(APL's), technical manuals, maintenance and training plans. 
Clearly this is an expensive and time consuming process that 
requires careful consideration before being selected. This 
form of support is difficult to provide for items that are 
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required immediately and is better suited for items whose 
delivery to operational units is less urgent. Items chosen to 
receive this form of support are likely to share these common 
characteristics: 
• System wide population. In order for this form of 
support to justify its large investment in time 
and resources, the item needs to be in general 
use across a range of activities.Long term 
requirement. Again, due to its expense, this is a 
form of support best suited for items that are 
anticipated to have a requirement for the 
foreseeable future. ' 
• Availability of technical data. In order for this 
approach to be feasible the item's manufacturer 
must be both willing and able to provide the 
Government with a complete technical data 
package. This raises proprietary rights issues 
and almost certainly will involve additional 
expense on behalf of the Government. [Ref. 15: p. 
35-37] 
a. Advantages 
. In spite of high up front costs for facilities, 
infrastructure, repair capabilities and equipment, this method 
is potentially the least expensive and most effective method 
of support for nondevelopmental items with high failure rates 
and large populations. [R~f. 14 p. 45] The approach has the 
additional appeal of being better suited to a wartime 
environment because maintenance capabilities are able to be 
located as close to combat units as is required. [Ref. 15: 
p.38] Although many defense contractors performed admirably 
during the Gulf war, it is not practical to expect contract 
personnel to always be willing to operate in a combat zone. 
7" _ _, 
b. Disadvantages 
Organic support is extremely costly for 
nondevelopmental items that fail infrequently or are limited 
in their application. Developing it may require the government 
to obtain technical or proprietary data that the producer is 
either unwilling to part with or wants a prohibitively high 
price for. Furthermore, the item must have sufficient 
maintainability and reliability data available in order to 
design the support. This information is simply unavailable 
with many nondevelopmental items. 
A final consideration is the time delay. If the item is 
withheld from the operator until complete organic support is 
designed and in place, then one of the primary advantages of 
nondevelopmental items, speed of introduction, is lost. 
3. Total Contractor Support 
TCS delegates responsibility for providing logistic 
support to the contractor. This may be done either overtly, 
by establishing a contractual obligation, or by default, if 
the system fails to provide other support options. The concept 
is quite simple. Upon failure, the item is returned to the 
contractor for restoration to working order. For a price the 
Government is relieved of the responsibility for developing a 
logistics support capability as well as maintaining the spare 
parts necessary to support that capability. Characteristics 
common to items best supported by this method include: 
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• Relatively high cost. The value of the item, its 
components or its salvage is great enough to 
justify the cost of providing an external support 
capability. 
• Relatively low failure rate. The item must be 
reliable for this approach to work. Items that 
tend to fail frequently would be both costly and 
difficult to support by this method. 
• Intended for use in a non- combat environment. 
Clearly the urgency of a combat environment would 
not lend itself well towards the time delay 
involved in packaging and transporting the item 
to the contractor. 
• Comparatively high tech. If the item is in a 
rapidly developing field or the requirement is 
for state of the art capability, this may be the 
most effective option. 
• Well established geographically diverse 
contractor. The Government needs to have 
reasonable assurance that the contractor will 
remain in business for the duration of the item 
and that it possesses the capability to provide 
support over a wide area. [Ref. 15: p. 34-35] 
. a. Advantages 
The TCS approach attempts to combine the advantages 
of the no support method and the organic support method. 
Responsibility for failures and support is borne solely by the 
contractor allowing the government to direct logistic 
resources into more profitable venues. This method may be the 
best option in high technology areas where maintaining state 
of the art capability is critical. [Ref. 14:p. 44] 
b. Disadvantages 
Total contractor support is restricted in the range 
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of items it is suitable for, since its feasibility for items 
intended for use in a combat environment is limited. If the 
contractor is not located near the user, high transportation 
costs and delays in replenishment of failed items are 
possible. 
The government must also recognize that they are in 
effect granting the contractor a monopoly on the repair 
business for the item. As such, the potential for excessive 
charges, poor quality work or simply inadequate support must 
be recognized. Additionally, should the contractor's business 
fail, the government may find itself with a large inventory of 
unsupported items. 
4. Contractor And Organic Support Mix 
The mix method seeks the best of both worlds. The concept 
is to capitalize on the strengths of both methods while 
avoiding the shortcomings of either. This is done by 
fashioning some form of shared responsibility for providing 
logistics support between the Government and the contractor. 
Presumably, the more of this burden the Government wishes to 
shift towards the contractor, the greater the cost of doing so 
will be. 
The mix approach may be beneficial for items that, not 
surprisingly, fall into the middle ground in many of the 
previously discussed categories. Some examples of this would 
be: 
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• Mid to low range failure rate. The item fails 
often enough that some form of organic capability 
is justified, but not so frequently that full 
blown in house support is necessary. 
• Mid-range technical complexity. The item is of 
such a nature that some form of organizational 
support is beneficial (i.e. lubrication, 
inspection) but overall the item is complex 
enough to make complete organic support 
undesirable. 
• Mid-range cost. The item is too expensive to be 
not supported and not expensive enough to justify 
either complete organic or contractor support. 
• Intended for use in both combat and non-combat 
environment. The item is intended for use in a 
range of different settings. [ Ref. lS:p. 38-39] 
a. Advantages 
The mix approach allows the government to enjoy the 
benefits of the total contractor support method while 
moderating some of the potential disadvantages of that method. 
It allows the government the flexibility to utilize a phased 
support approach in which the support system is designed 
incrementally in response to the availability of maintenance 
assets. [Ref. lS:p. 39] 
Another benefit to this method is that it allows a 
program opting for organic support to field the system 
immediately and use the contractor to provide support on an 
interim basis. This gives the government the time to develop 
its own support assets, or evaluate if it is cost effective to 
do so, while still realizing the benefit of placing the item 




The mix approach can be costly if improperly 
implemented or carelessly administered. It can be difficult to 
control the transition from one method to the next. Failure to 
clearly delineate responsibilities, requirements and time 
frames for each party can result in costly delays and 
misunderstandings. The potential exists to be paying for two 
separate and distinct support systems neither of which is 
providing the level of benefit one would expect from a single 
"pure" approach. [Ref. lS:p. 39] 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter II has laid the foundation for examining the 
research questions presented in Chapter I. It begins by 
defining what a nondevelopmental item is and giving some 
background on the movement to increase the use of 
nondevelopmental items in DOD acquisitions. It examines the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with nondevelopmental 
items and the differences in the acquisition process for 
developmental versus nondevelopmental items. It concludes by 
exploring the primary methods of supporting a nondevelopmental 




III. THE PORTABLE HYDRAULIC ACCESS RESCUE SYSTEM (PHARS) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will define what the PHARS is and examine 
the history of the its acquisition. It will also serve to 
introduce, and provide a context for, the logistics issues to 
be explored in Chapter IV. 
B. DEFINITION 
The term PHARS is a generic one used to describe a 
portable hydraulic tool whose intended use involves cutting 
through, or punching holes in, sheet metal. The Navy's primary 
interest in the tool lies in it's potential for rescuing 
personnel trapped behind structural metal during damage 
control operations. Secondary features of interest to the Navy 
include the ability to make bulkhead penetrations or remove 
obstructions in order to allow either entry into a space or 
access for de-watering. Additional applications include use 
for assistance with cleanup and salvage. [Ref. 17] 
C. HISTORY 
For decades, commercial fire fighting and rescue 
departments have successfully employed PHARS type equipment to 
extricate victims of automobile accidents. Their utility has 
been recognized in other commercial and industrial 
applications such as channel dredging, salvage operations, 
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offshore drilling operations, oil refineries, shipyards and 
harbor terminals. [Ref. 17] 
The roots of the Navy 1 s acquisition of the PHARS lie in 
the 1987 disaster in which the USS Stark was struck by two 
Exocet misses fired by an Iraqi warplane. The resulting 
conflagration killed 37 U.S. servicemen and caused some $45 
million in damage to the Stark. The fire was so hot that the 
main deck and the starboard side of the ship glowed cherry 
red. Starks solid steel main deck was warped. Structural 
damage to the ship was enormous with mangled compartments and 
hatches melted shut by deckplate temperatures in excess of 
1400 degrees Fahrenheit. The fires raged for three days and 
were fought by personnel from 5 ships who had rushed to the 
Stark 1 s aid. [Ref. 18:p. 2-5] 
During the prolonged fire fighting and damage control 
operations onboard Stark, the Navy learned of some critical 
, equipment shortcomings. These deficiencies were summarized in 
a message composed by the USS Conyngham,one of the primary 
ships rendering 
among them was 
assistance during the disaster. Prominent 
a need for "emergency extrication. equipment". 
They were identified as the result of a prescient commander 
who had actually fought the fire. He ordered those directly 
involved to sit down and "brain storm" about what went right, 
what went wrong and what additional equipment would have been 
valuable to them in their efforts to control the fire and save 
lives. 
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As a result of the Conyngham message on 19 Oct, 1987 the 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Requested a total of $64 
million dollars from Congress. These funds were to be used to 
outfit the fleet with the items on the Conyngham list. Of this 
amount $3 million was specifically earmarked for procurement 
of emergency extrication equipment. [Ref. 19] 
D. THE INITIAL ATTEMPT AT AN ORGANIC SUPPORT BASED 
PROCUREMENT 
NAVSEA immediately began efforts to produce a technical 
specification for the PHARS. Traditionally this specification 
is what the Navy's Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) would use 
to produce a commercial item description (CID) in order to 
contract for the device. These specifications are also 
essential to the Naval Ships Systems Engineering Station 
(NAVSESS) and SPCC and in determining the types and quantities 
of equipment necessary to provide organic support for an 
item. [Ref. 20] 
The actual process of creating the specification was, 
unfortunately, an extremely lengthy one. Fraught with 
bureaucratic infighting,·· personality conflicts and a 
contractual protest, it was not completed until September of 
1991, over four years from the Stark tragedy. 
Among the many factors contributing to the delay, two 
stand out. The first was a formal protest by the Hale Fire 
Pump Corporation. The company contended that the NAVSEA 
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specification called for "better than industry standards" and 
would necessitate extensive modifications of the supplier's 
production line. The company's position was and is that the 
Navy was attempting to obtain a defacto developmental item 
under the guise of a nondevelopmental procurement. Although 
the protest was eventually denied, it served to significantly 
extend and complicate the process. [Ref. 22] 
The second delaying factor originated at SPCC. In August 
of 1990, NAVSEA provided SPCC with completed technical 
specification. SPCC immediately set to work to procure and 
provision the item. During this process however, one of the 
provisioners, an ex Damage Control Chief Petty Officer, 
noticed that the specification called for an electrically 
powered (440V) PHARS. Since the PHARS was intended to be used 
during damage control operations onboard ship when electrical 
power is frequently unavailable, he felt the specification was 
unrealistic. He raised the issue with his superiors, who after 
liaising with the Atlantic Fleet Nondevelopmental Item 
activity, concurred. They then recommended the specification 
be re-done calling instead for a diesel powered PHARS. 
The net result of all this was to effectively freeze any 
movement towards introducing the PHARS to the fleet by 
traditional methods. It was also to have significant 
ramifications for the logistic support and configuration 
management of the item. 
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E. CONTRACTOR SUPPORTED TOOLS ARE INTRODUCED 
In September of 1988 the Under Secretary of the Navy for 
Safety and Survivability, extremely frustrated by what he 
termed the "paralysis of analysis", took a highly unusual 
step. He personally authorized any command with procurement 
authority and available discretionary funds to buy the PHARS 
directly from the manufacturer. [Ref. 17] This was done largely 
as a function of the Under Secretary's perception that NAVSEA 
was making insufficient progress towards completing a 
specification which would allow SPCC to bid, purchase and 
provision the item. The Under Secretary's opinion in this 
matter is best expressed in his own words: 
We had a tool with a proven track record of saving 
lives. We also had ships and sailors going in harms 
way without that tool. I couldn't have cared less 
about paperwork or logistics, my primary concern 
was to, as rapidly as possible; put that tool in 
the hands of the men likely to need it most. [Ref. 
21] 
To a large extent the Under Secretary achieved this goal 
by creating a system which gave the fleet operator not only 
the ability to buy the PHARS, but also legal justification for 
so doing. The authority was granted under an innovative 
document known as an Interim Qualification Requirement (IQR) . 
The IQR was created by the Under Secretary's Contracting 
Officer, and based on testing done at the Atlantic Fleet 
Nondevelopmental Item Facility In Norfolk, Virginia. 
The document certified that three companies, Hurst, 
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Holmatro and Phoenix as produced a tool that met the Navy's 
needs. [Ref.17] The logistics support philosophy was intended 
as total contractor support buttressed by a comprehensive one 
year "all parts and labor" warranty offered by each company. 
In the time period between 1988 and 1991, over 300 PHARS 
devices were procured and delivered to the fleet under this 
approach. Some of these were bought by individual units using 
the Under Secretary's IQR and they were spread among the three 
companies listed therein. The majority, however, were bought 
with funds obtained by the Under Secretary's office and 
"pushed" (delivered without a requisition on behalf of the 
receiving activity) to the fleet. These consisted of 
approximately 75~ of the total and were exclusively 
manufactured by Hurst. [Ref. 20] 
The PHARS then entered the system with no provisioning or 
organic support from SPCC and without the benefit of detailed 
testing or a technical specification from NAVSEA. Precise 
information on which ships got which device, or even how many 
were delivered, individually or in total, was not kept. This 
oversight started a "logistics support nightmare" [Ref. 20] 
which continues to plague the program even today. 
Needless to say, this action was cause for some 
consternation at both NAVSEA and SPCC. This was a significant, 
at the time almost a complete, departure from the traditional 
approach. Traditionally, some form of technical specification 
and at least some minimal Allowance Parts List (APL)support 
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was in place before an item with a system wide application was 
introduced. 
NAVSEA's position on this approach was succinctly 
summarized in a letter from the Commander Naval Sea Systems 
Command as follows: 
The burden of ensuring that the fleet receives 
equipment that meets its operational requirement, 
and the assumption of life cycle responsibility for 
that equipment rests upon NAVSEA not SECNAV, 
CINCLANTFLT-NDI or individual manufacturers. 
Controlled and documented tests are the only method 
by which .. NAVSEA can be expected to insure the 
adequacy of the equipment that it puts on fleet 
ships. [Ref. 23:p. 2] 
SPCC's position on the matter was summed up in the words 
of the program manager for damage control items: 
I had a real problem with a safety and 
survivability item being placed on ships with no 
organic support available. That may be fine as long 
as the ship stays pier-side, but what happens when 
the thing breaks and the ship is on the other side 
of the world? It's my job to make sure these things 
are properly supported and my phone is going to be 
the one ringing when people can't, or don't know 
how, to get spare parts. [Ref. 20] 
In spite of these very real and vociferously expressed 
concerns, the PHARS, as a completely contractor supported 
device, continued to proliferate throughout the fleet. This 
was due in no small part to the increasing tensions in the 
Persian Gulf. The escalating crisis fostered an atmosphere of 
urgency that allowed the Under Secretary's "get the stuff out 
there, paperwork to follow" philosophy to prevail. At the same 
35 
time however, pressure from Congress and bureaucratic 
momentum also served to keep the procurement based on 
conventional support methods slowly moving forward. 
By 1993, there existed in the fleet an unknown number of 
PHARS, produced by a variety of manufacturers. Concerns about 
maintainability and supportability led the program manager at 
SPCC to begin an extensive effort to reverse engineer organic 
logistics support for all the PHARS in the system. Until that 
time, the only support provided for these items was in the 
form of an instructional video, the manufacturer's warranty 
and manuals, and the expertise of the personnel at the 
Atlantic Fleet Nondevelopmental Item Facility. 
F. AN ORGANICALLY SUPPORTED PHARS IS DELIVERED 
A procurement under conventional methods was finally 
completed in July of 1993 when SPCC issued a contract to the 
Phoenix corporation to supply the Navy with 47 PHARS. [Ref. 
24] It is noteworthy that this was accomplished fully six 
years after the Stark attack and over 5 years after the device 
was first introduced to the fleet. 
This procurement was, for all practical purposes, the 
polar opposite of the previous buy(s). The support philosophy 
was 100% organic. This buy was the result of an exhaustive 
test and evaluation process and driven by an extremely 
comprehensive commercial item description. Engineers at NAVSEA 
and NAVSESS, as well as provisioning and contracting personnel 
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at SPCC, had spent years getting it right. 
Included in the contract was the requirement for the 
company to provide the Navy with the provisioning technical 
documentation (PTD) that SPCC and NAVSESS would require in 
order to provide 100% organic support for the PHARS. This was 
a critical omission in the first buy (s) . As provisioning 
personnel at SPCC tried to build support for the PHARS not 
obtained under this contract, they had to go,"hat in hand" to 
the manufacturers and ask for the data. This was an extremely 
tedious process since the companies in many instances viewed 
the data as proprietary and were under no contractual 
obligation to provide it. [Ref.20] 
In order to complete the development of organic support, 
a national stock number (NSN) was assigned and an Allowance 
Parts List (APL) , with all significant subcomponenets broken 
out and stock numbered, was developed. A new and completely 
different maintenance philosophy existed. Instead of total 
contractor support the PHARS was classified as an organic 
repairable and slated for both organizational and intermediate 
level maintenance. A complete planned maintenance system (PMS) 
was created and delivered with the tool. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter covered what the PHARS is, its history and 
the roots of the Navy's interest in the device. It examined 
the nature of various procurements by SECNAV, CINCLANTFLT 
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Nondevelopmental Item Facility, NAVSEA and SPCC. It also 
delineated the difference in support, procurement and 
maintenance philosophy among these organizations. 
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IV. PHARS LOGISTICS SUPPORT ISSUES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will lay the foundation for the cost benefit 
analysis to be conducted in Chapter V. It will do so by 
examining the logistics issues resulting from the conflicting 
procurement and support strategies. As part of this analysis 
failure data for the system, both predicted and observed, will 
be presented. Also included in the data will be the results 
of a fleet wide survey on the satisfaction with the types of 
the logistic support currently being provided the 
PHARS. [Appendix B) This survey was conducted among supply 
officers and damage control assistants on afloat units. 
B. PHARS LOGISTICS ISSUES 
As a result of the range of methods and support 
philosophies under which the PHARS was introduced to the 
fleet, there are a host of logistics challenges associated 
with the program. They may be grouped into five general 
categories: 
• Allowance Part Lists (APL's) and Stock Numbering 
• Planned Maintenance and Maintenance Requirements 
• Technical Manuals 
• Training 
• Configuration Issues 
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1. APL Issues 
An APL takes a major component and breaks it down 
into the subcomponents or piece parts it is composed of. It 
identifies each component and subcomponent either by NSN or 
part number. This information is essential to the fleet 
operator for performing both supply and maintenance functions. 
In essence, if any level of organic support is planned for the 
item, a complete and accurate APL is intrinsic to that 
process. 
The PHARS system is made up of the following major 
components: 
• Hydraulic power unit 
• Engine Diesel 
• Ram, Hydraulic 
• Spreader, Hydraulic 
• Cutter, Hydraulic 
• Reel, Hose with Hose on Reel 
• Hose, Hydraulic 
• Manual, Technical 
• Manifold, -Multiple Connection 
• Fluid, Hydraulic 
a. APL's And Stock Number Support 
In theory, to provide complete organic support, each 
one of these major components is, or should be, APL supported. 
As of September 1995 this action had only been completed for 
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the Phoenix tool acquired in the most recent SPCC Procurement. 
[Ref. 25] 
This means that ships with PHARS from Holmatro and Hurst, 
as well as ships holding Phoenix tools bought in the late 80's 
or very early 90's, do not have accurate and complete APL's. 
The result is a lack of specific information on what 
equipment they should be carrying and how they should go about 
obtaining it. Under the currently available APL, a ship 
attempting to organically support any PHARS other than the 
most recent Phoenix tool will find its storerooms stocked with 
equipment of limited utility at best. 
This in turn tends to frustrate the very concept of 
organic support. If a fleet operator is unable to determine 
how to obtain repair parts from the supply system, or those 
parts don't match his needs, his options are to seek 
commercial support or discard the item. With approximately 
half the PHARS in the Navy inventory falling into this 
category this is a serious and ongoing problem. 
For illustration purposes consider the APL for the 
diesel engine component on the Phoenix PHARS bought by SPCC in 
1993. It is two pages long and lists 51 subcomponents. A ship 
with one PHARS assigned would be required to carry 29 of these 
subcomponents in onboard inventory. The value of these carried 
subcomponents, based on a check of stock system prices as of 
18 Jan, 1996 is $391.00. Extrapolating out over nine other 
primary components, three separate configurations and three 
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hundred ships, gives one an idea of the scope of the issue. 
NAVSEA has taken steps to address the problem by 
contracting with NAVSESS in an attempt to create a generic 
"parent" APL. The purpose of the parent APL will be to cover 
the tools from all three manufacturers under one APL "family" 
and hopefully simplify ordering and maintenance procedures. To 
date, over $50,000.00 has been invested in this endeavor. The 
work is ongoing and no completion date has been established. 
[Ref. 26] 
Closely related to the problems associated with the APLs 
is the generic NSN issue. SPCC currently uses a generic NSN 
(4240-01-279-8598) for the PHARS systems. Units ordering a 
PHARS under this stock number can receive any of the three 
different tools. This has two distinct effects. First it tends 
to speed the requisitioning process as orders are able to be 
filled by whichever tool is in stock or can most rapidly be 
procured. This speed, however, is bought at the price of the 
second effect, a short circuit of the organic support concept. 
An examination of the history of this practice shows that 
PHARS of various manufacturers are being reported as de~ivered 
to the same ship. [Ref. 2 7] This introduces the problem of 
mixing components between systems as well as potentially 
forcing the ship to bear the cost of supporting completely 
different versions of the same tool. 
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2. Planned Maintenance And Maintenance Requirements 
Issues 
The current commercial maintenance philosophy for the 
PHARS requires routine cleaning, checking fluid levels and 
visual inspection of components for wear and damage. Most 
component repair is limited to the replacement of worn or 
broken tool accessories and parts. Currently, damaged hoses, 
fittings, pumps and engines are repaired by a nationwide 
network of authorized dealers. In the course of this research 
the author had cause to contact a wide range of dealers 
representing each of the three manufacturers. Without 
exception they provided prompt, knowledgeable and courteous 
service. 
Concerns over support for deployed units has led the Navy 
to attempt to replicate the commercial maintenance philosophy 
on an organic basis. Shipboard or organizational maintenance 
is intended to be similar to existing commercial practices. 
Major repair is slated for accomplishment at an intermediate 
level onboard a Tender or at a Shore Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity (SIMA). [Ref. 20] 
The Navy supports its equipment at the shipboard level 
under the planned maintenance system (PMS) philosophy. Under 
this system equipments are subject to maintenance and 
inspection checks of varying degrees at specified intervals. 
The individual performing the maintenance is required to 
perform the maintenance while in possession of a Maintenance 
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Requirements Card (MRC) . The card describes in exhaustive 
detail just how the check is to be performed and what 
materials are required to be used in performing the check. 
a. Incomplete PMS 
The use of three different vendors for the PHARS has 
produced a range of tools each with unique maintenance needs. 
To date, only the Phoenix tool has a complete and 
comprehensive 
packages are in 
be delivered. 
[Ref. 26] 
organic PMS package. The other maintenance 
varying states of development and are yet to 
b. Incomplete Maintenance Requirements Cards 
Currently, MRC's are not available for all existing 
PHARS. Those that do exist are inaccurate and unclear as to 
differences between units. [Ref. 28] The fact that ships are 
unclear as to the maintenance requirements is evident. In 1995 
decommissioning units turned 35 units into the CINCLANTFLT 
Nondevelopmental Item Facility. Of the returned units, 30 
(85.7%) required major repair, directly related to PMS being 
performed incorrectly or not at all. [Ref. 28] 
c. Hydraulic Fluids 
Another significant maintenance issue plaguing the 
PHARS program is hydraulic fluids. Presently each of the three 
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tools requires a different type of fluid: 
• Hurst I Hale uses phosphate ester Mil-H-19457 
• Holmatro uses a synthetic hydrocarbon Mil-H-83282 
• Phoenix uses Diethylene Glycol Mil-H-22072 
The fluids are not interchangeable and mixing of the fluids 
results in potentially significant damage to the device. At 
best, the hydraulic lines will simply clog and render the 
PHARS inoperative but repairable. At worst, rusting and 
pitting of major components has been observed, damaging the 
tool beyond repair. [Ref. 28] 
It is unfortunate that the Navy finds itself in this 
position at all. A December 1988 report by the Naval Ship 
System Engineering Station (NAVSESS) "strongly reconunended" 
that Phosphate ester be specified as the sole acceptable 
hydraulic fluid. [Ref. 27:p. 12] This report not withstanding, 
the Commercial Item Description issued by SPCC in July of 1993 
cites three different hydraulic fluids as acceptable. [Ref. 
30:p. 2] As fate would have it, each of the three 
manufacturers has opted to select a different fluid. 
d. Hydraulic Hoses 
Perhaps the most well publicized maintenance issue 
currently facing the PHARS centers around the hydraulic hoses 
employed by the Phoenix companies tool. These hoses have been 
repeatedly reported by fleet units as having ruptured during 
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operation. There has been a documented instance where a 
hydraulic hose burst during operation and sprayed the operator 
in the eyes with hydraulic fluid. Clearly, the rupturing hoses 
pose a threat to personnel safety and impact overall operation 
and maintenance of the device. [Ref. 31] 
The cause of the problem is the source of some debate. 
One school of thought holds that the problem lies in the 
companies own test procedures. While Hurst and Holmatro both 
test their hoses at a specification calling for failure at 
over 20,000 lbs Per square inch (PSIO, the Phoenix spec only 
calls for 7500 lbs PSI. No hoses on any tool other than the 
Phoenix have been reported as failing. 
Phoenix's position is that the failures were caused by 
faulty hoses supplied to it by one of its subcontractors and 
has since changed suppliers. Naval Surface Warfare Center, 
Philadelphia Pa., continues to investigate the failures and 
has yet to identify a specific cause. 
Further exacerbating the issue is that no replacement 
hoses are available through the Navy supply system. Lack of 
organic parts support will almost certainly force operators to 
seek commercially available replacements. A random check of 
three authorized dealers in California on 23 January, 1996, 
showed all three to have the hose in stock and ready for 
immediate shipment. 
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e. Technica~ Manua~s 
The Phoenix system is the only one of the three 
tools to have a completed technical manual, written to Navy 
standards. The manual is stock numbered and available at no 
cost under NSN 0910-LP-572-2100. The other manuals are written 
to commercial specifications, are not standardized, and are 
not presented in any format familiar to the shipboard 
operator. 
Resolving this issue will be time consuming and costly 
since much of the material required to produce a tech manual 
to Navy standards is considered proprietary by the industry. 
Hurst and Holmatro are under absolutely no contractual 
obligation to provide the Navy with this information. As such, 
they can set their own price or simply refuse to provide the 
data. [Ref. 20] 
3. Training 
In any damage control scenario the key to how well 
an individual or a ship performs lies in the level of 
training. The mantra throughout the fleet and in the damage 
control schools is that in a crisis "training takes over." The 
issue for the PHARS is that each unit is connected and used 
differently. In the event of an actual emergency, precious 
minutes could be lost due to confusion over the operation of 
differing tools. 
Attempting to organically support three different tools 
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will require fleet personnel to be familiar with the operation 
of all three. This in turn will require training commands to 
teach all three. In order to do this each training command 
must possess one of each of the units. 
a. School House Training 
PHARS use is currently taught in the General Damage 
Control Shipboard class (course #045) and the General Damage 
Control Team Training class (course #046) . Students are given 
the opportunity to see the tool, put it together, start it and 
run it as a demo. Unfortunately, The schools currently possess 
only the Hurst tool and as such, it is the only tool that 
fleet personnel are receiving formalized hands on training 
with. No testing has been done to determine how each 
manufacturers equipment performs against similar damage. 
b. Damage Control Layout Booklet 
The intent of this book is to provide the fleet 
operator with a specific illustration of how and under what 
circumstances the various equipment in his damage control 
arsenal may be used. The book possesses sketches on general 
usage of the PHARS but does not address the different 
techniques required for the use of different tools. For 
complete organic support the book will need to be updated to 
address the differences between tools. 
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4. Configuration Issues 
Configuration management is the system by which a 
product's planned and changing configurations are accurately 
identified, and for which control and accountability of change 
are maintained. [Ref. 32:p. 228] Lack of standardization and 
shoddy records keeping are at the heart of the configuration 
issues faced by the PHARS program today. 
a. Lack Of Standardization 
Configuration challenges are inherent to most 
nondevelopmental item procurements. Since the government 
exercises no control over the production or design phases, the 
manufacturer is free to make changes or substitutions to any 
component they desire. This issue is compounded in the case 
of the PHARS by the fact that the Navy is using tools from 
three different manufacturers. Each tool possesses a different 
design, different capabilities and different operating 
characteristics. 
b. Unknown Types And Quantities 
Imagine hosting a dinner party upon whose success 
lives could literally depend. Imagine also that you don't know 
how many people are coming, their tastes or dietary 
requirements. It is in a similar situation that the life cycle 
manager for the PHARS finds himself. His dilemma is caused by 
the fact that a complete and accurate list of quantities and 
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types of PHARS does not currently exist in the fleet. [Ref. 
2 0] 
The lack of information on units in fleet possession is 
attributable to the rush to place some form of PHARS 
capability on ships deploying to the Persian Gulf during 
Desert Storm I Desert Shield. Incomplete records were kept of 
ships procuring PHARS under the Interim Qualification 
Requirement provided by Under Secretary Taussig's office. 
Additionally, the CINCLANTFLT Nondevelopmental Item Facility 
has only fragmentary information on the number and type of 
PHARS it procured for shipboard use in the period 1988-1991. 
Current best estimates place the number of PHARS 
possessed by the fleet at 380-400. [Ref. 32 ]The distribution 
of PHARS procured under contract by SPCC is known to be: 
• Hale 126 units [Ref. 33] 
• Holmatro 66 units [Ref. 34] 
• Phoenix 153 units [Ref. 35] 
This translates into between nine and fourteen percent of the 
PHARS in the fleet as being of unknown origin and therefore 
virtually unsupportable by organic means. 
C. FAILURE DATA 
Based on information provided by all three participating 
manufacturers and corroborated by NAVSESS, the projected 
serviceable life of the PHARS is 500 hours. [Ref. 27:p. 12] 
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Based on recurring demand, data provided by the 
PHARS program manager at SPCC shows the actual system wide 
failure rate is one unit per quarter or 4 per year. [Ref. 20] 
D. SURVEY RESULTS 
300 surveys were mailed to afloat units. The survey asked 
the Supply Officer and Damage Control Assistant to answer both 
qualitative and quantitative questions with respect to 
logistics support for the PHARS. The fleet returned 44 surveys 
for a response rate of 14.67%. The results are summarized in 
the following table: 
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PHARS LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
Phoenix Hurst Holmatro Totals 
Type of PHARS 21 18 5 44 
Held Onboard 
# That Are 21 0 0 21 
APL Supported 
Availability Sat (18) Sat (16) Sat (5) Sat (39) 
of Repair Unsat (3) Unsat (2) Unsat (0) Unsat (5) 
parts 
Method for Organic (17) Organic (2) Organic (1) Organic (20) 
Meeting Parts Comm. (4) Comm (16) Comm (4) Comm (24) 
Demand 












Adequate 16 13 3 32 
Maintenance 
Plan In Place 
Satisfaction Sat (15) Sat (13) Sat (4) Sat (32) 
With Overall Unsat (8) Unsat (5) Unsat (1) Unsat (14) 
Level of 
Support 
Table No. 1 Survey Results 
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E. INTERPRETATION OF SURVEY RESULTS 
The results of the survey came as somewhat of a surprise. 
The author had hypothesized that units possessing PHARS 
lacking complete organic support would be less satisfied with 
their support structure. Instead, the survey results indicated 
in the large majority of categories measured, that units with 
commercially supported PHARS had an equivalent or higher 
degree of satisfaction with their method of logistics support. 
The following table summarizes the survey data with respect to 
satisfaction levels for 
supported tools. 
commercially vice organically 
Percentage Breakdown of Operator Reported 
Satisfaction for Alternative Support Methods 
Commercial Organic Preferred 
Availability of 16/18 18/21 Commercial 
Repair Parts = 91.3% = 85.7% 
Adequately 11/23 10/21 Commercial 
Trained Operator = 47.8% = 47.6% 
Onboard 
Satisfactory Tech 13/23 12/21 Commercial 
Manual Onboard = 56.5% = 52.3% 
Adequate 16/21 16/23 Organic 
Maintenance Plan = 76.2% = 69.6% 
in Place 
Satisfied with 15/21 17/23 Commercial 
Overall level of =71.4% = 73.9% 
Support 
Table No. 2 Sat~sfact~on Levels 
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As illustrated above the fleet operator has expressed 
preference for commercial vice organic support in four of the 
five categories measured. Although in many cases the degree of 
preference expressed is quite small it is a critical 
distinction. Its significance lies in the fact that the Navy 
is currently expending a great deal of time and money to 
switch the support philosophy to a method deemed less 
satisfactory by the end user. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the logistics issues surrounding 
the PHARS program. It presented data on support, maintenance, 
training and failure rates for the item. The chapter concludes 
with a survey which uses both qualitative and quantitative 
measures to gauge fleet perception of current levels of 
logistic support. 
54 
V. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will present an analysis of the cost 
effectiveness of the current logistic support philosophy for 
the PHARS. For the purpose of this analysis cost effectiveness 
will be related to the measure of the PHARS performance as 
a function of the type of logistics support provided. The 
PHARS performance will be defined in terms of its ability to 
complete its mission as expressed by those actually operating 
the system. 
B. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
Three different models of the PHARS were originally 
introduced to the fleet under a philosophy of 100% contractor 
support. That philosophy was subsequently modified to be 100% 
organic support. To date, only one of the three systems has 
achieved complete organic support. Based on Survey data 
collected from actual fleet operators, satisfaction with 
logistic support is slightly lower for the organically 
supported model. This analysis will examine the cost savings 
available from continuing with 100% contractor support for the 
remaining two systems. 
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C. ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
A number of assumptions are made in deriving logistic 
support costs for the PHARS. The first assumption, that cost 
estimates are for afloat units only, as opposed to both afloat 
units and shore sites, was made in order to scope the study 
into manageable parameters. It is expected that it will be 
possible to extrapolate the results to include shore based 
inventory costs as well. 
The study also includes the following qualitative 
assumptions: 
• That effective support is best defined by the end 
user of the item. 
• That there is a cost associated with delaying 
deployment of an item with a proven safety and 
survivability application. 
• That Naval personnel are as capable of reading 
and following instructions in a manufacturer's 
manual as their civilian counterparts. 
Quantitative assumptions: 
• A 3QO ship Navy. 
• A Fleet-wide population of 390 PHARS. 
• A distribution roughly equal to 40% organically 
supported, 60% commercially supported. 
• A life cycle of 10 years for the system. 
• A discount rate of 5.7%. [Ref. 36 Appendix C] 
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• A cost to produce a technical manual of $250 per 
page. [Ref.26] 
• An average inventory of 85 line items with a 
value of $1300.00 (rounded) required to support 
one PHARS at the shipboard level. 
• Sunk costs will be ignored. 
D. PHARS LIFE CYCLE QUANTITATIVE COST ELEMENTS 
The following Quanti ta ti ve lifecycle and support cost 
elements will be examined: 
• Cost of APL Support. 
• Cost of Navy Technical Manual. 
• Cost of Training. 
• Cost of developing PMS. 
1. Cost Of APL Support 
There are two significant costs the Navy will incur by 
providing APL support for the two commercially supported 
PHARS. They are: 
• Cost.of. sbipboard inventory. 
• Cost of developing two additional and separate 
APL's. 
The cost of maintaining an APL driven shipboard inventory 
is computed as follows (Assumes equivalent range and depth of 
repair parts for all three tools): 
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$1300.00 (cost of support) x 390 (number of items) x .6 
(Percentage of items not APL Supported) = $304,200.00. 
The second cost incurred as a result of providing organic 
support is the cost of developing the APL. Based on a cost of 
$9000.00 to develop the APL for the Phoenix tool [Ref.36], the 
cost to create a complete APL for the Hurst and Holmatro tools 
would be: 
$9000 X 2 = $18,000.00. 
The benefit sacrificed by avoiding these costs is the 
instant availability of repair parts for the item. This 
sacrifice is mitigated by the extremely low failure rate of 
the item as discussed in chapter IV. Additional mitigating 
factors include the world wide network of dealers and the 
demonstrated ability of a number of air delivery services to 
provide overnight delivery. 
2. Cost Of Navy Technical Manuals 
There are two issues involved in providing tech manual 
support for the PHARS .. One issue is qualitative and one 
quantitative. This section will examine the quantitative 
issue. 
The current cost to produce a technical manual to Navy 
standards is approximately $250.00 per page. [Ref. 26] The 
Navy standard tech manual provided for the Phoenix tool is 139 
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pages long. The Cost to produce Phoenix tech manual was: 
139 X $250.00 = $34,750 
The cost for producing manuals for the Hurst and Holmatro tool 
would then be given as: 
$250.00 X 139 X 2 = $69,500.00 
The benefit sacrificed in order to obtain these savings 
is the capability to provide Naval maintenance personnel with 
detailed technical information, presented in a format they are 
familiar with. The loss of this benefit must be evaluated in 
terms of the intended maintenance philosophy. Clearly, the 
benefit~received is directly related to the amount and level 
of intended organizational maintenance. Moderating the loss of 
this benefit is the fact that both commercially supported 
models come equipped with the manufacturer's use and 
maintenance manual. Survey data indicates that 52% of the 
operators of the commercially supported tool are satisfied 
with their manuals. The organically supported manual was only 
received slightly more favorably with 57% of the operators 
reporting satisfaction. 
3. Cost Of Training 
There are three costs associated with providing organic 
training for the PHARS. The first, and largest, is the cost of 
developing and producing the training approach itself. This 
cost can be broken into two categories: curriculum development 
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and generating instructor manuals. This task is normally given 
to a contractor specializing in training. For an item of the 
complexity and range of application of the PHARS, this cost is 
estimated to be in the range of $50,000.00 [Ref. 37] 
Since each of the three tools currently in the Navy 
inventory is connected and used differently, a unique 
curriculum and instructor's manual will be necessary for each 
tool. Total cost to produce training curriculum and 
instructors manuals: 
2 X $50,000.00 = $100,000.00 
The- second cost associated with training is the hourly 
wage rate of the personnel who are providing the training. 
This cost is variable since it is dependent upon the rank of 
the individual assigned. Instructors at both the Basic 
Shipboard Damage Control and Firefighting School, as well as 
the Damage Control Team Trainer School, are typically Chief 
Petty Officers. An hourly wage rate for those individuals is 
provided in the table below: 
Instructor Wage Rates 
E-9 E-8 E-7 
Rate $32.65 $25.91 $23.91 
Table No. 3 Instructor Wage Rates [Ref. 38] 
The courses are taught in both Norfolk and San Diego. 
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Taking an average of the instructor wage rates, and assuming 
that each course would be presented six times a year with the 
PHARS covered for a two hour period, the additional cost of 
providing training for all three PHARS would be: 
$27.49 (wages) x 24 (courses) x 2 (tools) = $1319.52 per 
year. 
The final costs to consider with regard to training is 
the cost of providing the tools themselves to the training 
commands. The current average cost of a PHARS system to the 
Navy is $10,000.00. [Ref. 26] Costs for providing all three 
tools to-each command would be: 
$10,000.00 x 2(commands) x 4 (tools) = $80,000.00 
The benefit sacrificed in order to obtain these savings 
would be the loss of standardization of operating skills. 
Although hardly trivial this loss must be viewed from the 
perspective that the Navy's decision to support three unique 
models of the PHARS renders virtually any standardization 
issue moot. Additionally each manufacturer does provide a 
training video on the start up and operation of their tool. 
4. Cost Of Developing PMS 
The cost of developing a planned maintenance system for 
the Phoenix system was $4,250.00 [Ref. 36] The cost to develop 
an equivalent system for the other two tools would be: 
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2 x $4,250.00 = $8,500.00 in potential savings. 
The benefit sacrificed in order to obtain this cost 
savings would be the lack of an exacting, highly standardized 
and scheduled preventative maintenance program. As addressed 
in chapter three, this area appears to be a problematic one 
and given the relatively low cost of implementation, the Navy 
may wish to absorb this cost. 
E. PHARS LIFE CYCLE QUALITATIVE COST ELEMENTS 
1. Costs Of Delaying Deployment 
An important consideration when evaluating the costs of 
logistic support for the PHARS must be the opportunity cost of 
delaying deployment in order to build organic support. The 
first organically supported PHARS did not reach the fleet 
until almost seven years after the initial requirement was 
identified. In contrast commercially supported PHARS were 
placed on ships within 11 months after identifying the 
requirement. Had the decision been made to wait for complete 
organic support,_ the Nc:-vy would have had to forgo the benefit 
of having the item aboard ship for a period of seven years. 
This foregone benefit, especially when dealing with items 
involving damage control or safety and survivability, is far 
from trivial. Data from the Safety and Survivability Office in 
Washington D.C. on two recent nondevelopmental item 
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procurements serves to reinforce this point. 
In July of 1986, Vice admiral J.B. Wilkinson, Commander 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), identified by letter the 
urgent need for a commercially available Helicopter Emergency 
Egress Device System (HEEDS). The HEEDS provides an emergency 
air supply to a pilot or crew member trapped in a sinking 
aircraft. The first deliveries to the fleet of this item took 
place in October of the same year. In the next three years of 
its use the HEEDS bottle was directly credited with saving 
17 lives. [Ref. 39] 
In ~ebruary 1991, the USS Tripoli struck a mine while 
conducting mine counter measure operations off the coast of 
Kuwait. She carried with her a commercially supported 
nondevelopmental item for use in ventilation and de-smoking 
known as a RAM fan. The RAM fan was onboard to meet a user 
defined requirement. It had been placed onboard in less than 
two months as the result of a phone call between the ships 
C.O. and the Safety and Survivability Office. After the blast, 
the Commanding Officer of the Tripoli wrote letters to both 
the Safety and Survivability Office and the Ram fan 
manufacturer. In them he expressed his conviction that the 
device was superior to his organically supported fans and that 
it played a significant role in saving his ship. [Ref. 40] 
Neither of these items was or is organically supported. 
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Both items, as a result of the urgency of need associated with 
their application, were placed in the fleet quickly without 
going through the wickets required for full organic support. 
Had either of these programs been slated for organic support 
and endured a lag from requirements identification to fleet 
introduction like the PHARS, the cost to the Navy would have 
been substantial. 
2. Availability Of Data 
This issue centers on the availability of the information 
required-to produce technical manuals for the two commercially 
supported PHARS. This information is critical to developing 
any form of organic support. As stated earlier, much of this 
material is proprietary and generally contracted and paid for 
as a deliverable at the time of the initial buy. This was not 
done in the case of the Hurst and Holmatro tools. Neither 
company is under any obligation to provide this information to 
the Navy. If and when they are willing to make the data 
available, they will most.certainly require compensation. To 
date no negotiations over the price of this material have 
taken place. 
The cost the Navy bears in attempting to obtain this 
benefit includes more than just the price of the material. It 
also must assume the risk that the manufacturer will either 
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not provide the material or will demand an exorbitant price 
for it. 
F. TOTAL COST OF PROVIDING 100% ORGANIC SUPPORT OVER A TEN 
YEAR LIFE CYCLE 
The total additional costs incurred by the Navy in order 
to provide complete organic support over the life cycle of the 


















(Technical manual development) 
(Training curriculum and manual 
(Annualy recurring instructor wages) 
(Additional PHARS required for training 
(PMS development) 
(Total first year costs) 
(Recurring salary expense, over a 9 year 
period and assuming a discount rate of 
5. 7%.) 
(Total additional cost of organic support 
throughout ten year life cycle of the 
PHARS.) 
This chapter has conducted a cost benefit analysis on the 
decision to provide 100% organic support for the PHARS. The 
criteria examined inciuded costs for APL support, training, 
maintenance planning and technical documentation. It 
demonstrated an increase in life cycle costs of $1,140,287.00 
as a result of the decision to provide 100% organic support 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focused on the history of the PHARS 
procurement as a means of addressing logistic support issues 
for nondevelopmental items. It examined alternative logistic 
support strategies and conducted a fleet wide survey on the 
degree of satisfaction with the level and type of logistic 
support currently being provided the PHARS. A cost benefit 
analysis was performed on the current strategy. This analysis 
may have-value to future program managers in assisting their 
decision on types and levels of support to be provided other 
nondevelopmental items. Based on survey response, the existing 
logistics support for the PHARS appears to be satisfactory. 
However, several areas were identified where improvements in 
both efficiency and effectiveness are possible . 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. There Is A More Cost Effective Way To Support The 
PHARS. 
The current philosophy of 100% organic support is not 
economically justified. Survey respondents actually rated 
their satisfaction with logistic support higher for the 
commercially supported tool. Results from the cost benefit 
67 
analysis indicate that the Navy will spend in excess of 
$1,000,000.00 over the next ten years to provide complete 
organic support for the PHARS. These funds will be spent to 
provide a method and level of support that the end user of the 
item deems less satisfactory than what already is in place. 
2. The PHARS Is Best Supported By A Contractor Organic 
Mix. 
As a function of its system wide application, low failure 
rate, high urgency of need, mid range cost and well 
established geographically diverse contractor the PHARS would 
best be supported by a mix of contractor and organic based 
support. 
a. Contractor Elements 
A number of factors combine to encourage the use of 
a mixed support method for the PHARS. Chief among them is the 
urgency associated with the initial procurement. Short term, 
need it now, nondevelopmental i tern procurements tend to 
preclude organic support, at least in the early stages of a 
system's life. The rush to field the system simply does not 
allow sufficient time for the development of an organic 
support capability. This does not mean that some form of 
organic support may not eventually be appropriate, but that 
the initial form of support should be from the contractor. 
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The next factor influencing the support choice is the 
durability of the i tern. As stated in chapter four, the 
projected operating life for the PHARS is five hundred hours. 
This translates into an annual system wide failure rate in the 
range of one in one hundred. The PHARS' long operating life is 
further extended by a limited range of use. Since it is 
primarily intended for use in emergency situations, it is not 
operated with great frequency. The low failure rate and 
limited use requirement makes full organic support costly and 
unnecessary. 
Support by a world-wide network of authorized dealers 
provides additional reinforcement for a mixed support method. 
Survey data would seem to suggest that the dealer network and 
existing air freight capabilities make it easier and faster to 
obtain parts support commercially. 
The final factor supporting the contractor side of a 
mixed support philosophy is the lack of standardization. By 
making the decision to accept three distinct and separate 
models into inventory, the Navy weighted the deck in favor of 
some form of contractor support. Retro fitting the entire 
program with organic support has been demonstrated to be a 
costly and time consuming affair. On a strict cost 
effectiveness based criteria, commercial support would seem to 
be the best of these options. 
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Cost effectiveness, however, should not be the sole basis 
for selection of a support method. Marginal benefit and best 
value must also be considered. Experience and research has 
shown that there are some PHARS logistic support functions 
best provided organically. 
b. Organic E~ements 
As discussed in Chapter IV, basic maintenance 
requirements are either not understood, not being performed 
correctly, or simply not being done. This is resulting in 
shorteneu life cycles and tools that may not be functional 
when needed. An explanation for this may be found in the 
demands of shipboard life. There are already an enormous 
number of systems with maintenance actions scheduled and 
required .. Given this, it is easy to see how a system not 
covered by organic PMS could be continuously deferred in the 
maintenance queue. Fortunately, as shown in Chapter V, the 
cost to develop an organic PMS package for the PHARS is 
relatively low and would add little to the life cycl~ cost. 
Indeed, by extending the life of the item and improving system 
readiness, an organic PMS package may actually pay for itself 
by lowering life cycle costs. 
Training is another area that may best be served by an 
organic approach. It seems reasonable that if a system is 
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worth having, then it's worth providing its operators with a 
common basis for understanding the requirements and range of 
its applications. While it is true that each manufacturer 
provides an instructional video with their tool, the videos 
are tailored to civilian uses. The manufacturers provide no 
information on Navy specific applications. 
Given the high costs associated with an organic training 
capability, the Navy may wish to explore some creative options 
for training on the PHARS. One option currently being explored 
by the life cycle manager is to create a Navy specific video. 
The video would use all three tools and demonstrate standard 
operating procedure for each. Its intent would be to provide 
some of the benefits of organic training while avoiding most 
of the costs. 
3. Lack Of Standardization Significantly Impacted 
Efficiency. 
The use of three separate manufacturers as supplier of 
the PHARS made logistics support exponentially more difficult. 
Each tool is conh~cted; configured and used dif1erently. This 
impacts the entire logistics spectrum from training, to 
maintenance, to parts support. The additional ownership costs 
incurred as a result of this practice were not considered. 
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4. The Shift In Support Philosophy Resulted In A 
Structural Mis-Alignment 
The rush to deploy the system in response to an 
operational requirement resulted in a default philosophy of 
contractor support. This philosophy was able to accommodate a 
diversity of tools and manufacturers. An entire population of 
tools was introduced to the fleet premised on this method of 
support. 
When the decision was made to switch from commercial to 
organic support, a rift in the logistics support structure 
occurred. Organic support is, by its nature, ill suited to 
varying configurations and operating requirements. The 
decision to shift forced the support establishment to attempt 
to support the item in an inverse fashion from that which it 
was accustomed to. The resulting. poor fit between the 
procurement strategy and the support philosophy decreased the 
effectiveness of the support while increasing its cost. 
5 . It Should Be Possible To Extrapolate The Lessons 
Learned From The PHARS Procurement To Other Similar 
Nondevelopmental Items. 
Nondevelopmental items bearing similar characteristics to 
the PHARS should be considered candidates for partial or 
complete contractor support. These characteristics should 
include: high urgency of need, durability, a proven technology 
and a well established and geographically diverse contractor. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of this research the following 
recommendations are presented: 
1. Programs Using Nondeveloprnental Items Should 
Identify A Support Strategy Early And Remain 
Consistent With It. 
The cost effectiveness of logistic support will be 
closely tied to the timing and consistency of the support 
strategy. This is particularly true for nondevelopmental items 
due to the rapidity with which they may be fielded. Failure to 
select a strategy early, and remain consistent with that 
strategy throughout the program, will almost certainly 
increase the costs and decrease the effectiveness of the 
support. 
2. DOD Should Establish A Repository of Lessons 
Learned on the Effectiveness of Nondeveloprnental 
Item Support Strategies. 
There currently exists no central data base that 
evaluate_s the performance of nondevelopmental i tern s-upport 
strategies. Valuable data on pitfalls to avoid and 
opportunities to exploit is being lost. A program manager 
opting for nondevelopmental items has no formalized method of 
benefitting from those who have gone before him. Navy program 
managers are unable to learn from their Army counterparts and 
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vice versa. As cost factors continue to motivate joint 
procurement efforts, the need for a mechanism to enable 
system integration will only increase. 
3. Program Managers Must Ensure That Their Procurement 
Strategy Is In Synch With Their Support Philosophy. 
In order to maximize the benefits inherent in a 
nondevelopmental item acquisition the procurement strategy and 
support philosophy must be on the same page. The benefits of 
speed to field, state of the art equipment and lower life 
cycle costs can be erased by a mis-aligned support philosophy. 
If the intent of the procurement is to rush an item into 
operation it is clearly best supported by the contractor. 
4. Programs Using Nondevelopmental Items Should 
·Carefully Select A Single Dedicated Contractor. 
Careful selection of a single dedicated contractor can 
simplify logistic support issues for programs using 
nondevelopmental items. Potential problem areas such as inter-
operability, inter-changeability, and configuration control 
are either eradicated or greatly reduced. The Navy's use of 
three contractors for the PHARS program, and the subsequent 
deluge of logistics issues, serves to illustrate this point. 
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5. A Program Should Speak With One Voice. 
"Too many cooks spoil the soup" is a truism which also 
applies to nondevelopmental item procurements. At various 
stages of the PHARS life cycle, decisions and actions by 
SECNAV, CINCLANTFLT, SPCC, NAVSEA and all three contractors 
played a major and often conflicting role in the program's 
development. One office, preferably that of the program 
manager, needs to be recognized by all parties involved as the 
focal point for decision making. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
• Examine the effect of statutory and regulatory 
competition requirements on the standardization 
and cost effectiveness of nondevelopmental item 
procurements. 
• Develop a series of case studies on 
effectiveness of varying forms of 
support for nondevelopmental items. 
the cost 
logistic 
• Examine nondevelopmental item support practices 
used by other nations. 
• Assess the progress made by the DOD acquisition 




























Alowance Parts List 
Commander In Chief Atlantic Fleet 
Damage Control Assistant 
Department of Defense 
Department of Defense Instruction 
Helicopter emergency Egress Device 





Mission Need Statement 
Maintenance Requirements Card 
Naval Air Systems Command 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Naval Ships Systems Engineering Station 
Naval Inventory Control Point 
Nondevelopmental Item 
National Stock Number 
Portable Hydraulic Access Rescue System 
Preventitive Maintenance System 




Provisioning Technical Documentation 
Secretary Of the Navy 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONS 
For Supply Officer 
1. Do you currently have (circle one) NSN 4240-01-376-3727, 
4240-01-331-6853 or 4240-01-279-8596 onboard? 
2. If yes, do you have APL support for this item? 
3. Would you judge availability of repair parts to be: 
a. Sat 
b. Unsat 









6. Do you have a technical manual on board? 
7. 
8. 
If yes does it meet your needs? 
Is your technical manual Navy standard or commercial in 
origin ? 
9. Do you currently have onboard an operator who has 
received satisfactory training in the use of the PHARS? 
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